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Abstract
The objective ofthestudyisto analyze of the reasons for the occurrence of opportunism amongst staff in organizations. Using the 
results of a staff survey, research was carried out into correlation-regression dependencies of the factors that cause different 
forms of labor opportunism amongst different categories of workers: managers and their subordinates. On the basis of a 
quantitative assessment of the level of labor opportunism, the study estimates the inclination towards opportunism in the context 
of different categories of staff, and ascertains conditions of stability in the occurrence of labor opportunism in the organization. 
The research conducted into the nature of interference of labor opportunism between managers and subordinates provides 
evidence that the opportunism of the staff is a response to the opportunism of their superiors. 
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1. Introduction
The issue of internal regulations and organizational structures of institutions, aimed at preventing and overcoming 
opportunistic activities amongst their employees (H. Mintzberg 1983), occupies a central position in modern theories 
of organization. This issue has recently been investigated in the context of the principal - agent relations hierarchy. 
Despite the fact that these hierarchical relationships are subject to a variety of opportunistic activities, publications in 
the economic literature have aimed primarily at curbing only one of them: collusion between managers and their 
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creating personal benefits(Crozier and Friedberg, 1977, Edwards 1979, Kofman and Lawarr´ee 1996). The main 
focus of these studies is limited to a substantiation of effective formal contracts within organizations that would 
minimize the opportunistic activities of staff.
Opportunism in Russia has a unique national flavor in which social ties are very important. These features are 
most pronounced in the characteristics of an employment relationship, where there are informal norms and rules 
(Bodrov, O., 2007, 2008). Research conducted in Kazan University (hereinafter KFU) reveals that 44% of the total 
volume of tasks that staff carry out are not, in their opinion, included in their duties and are not tasks for which they 
are paid extra. In formal contractual relations, managers do not have a right to force workers to perform a task not 
covered by their contract, and subordinates can refuse to perform these tasks. However, managers successfully use 
informal methods of coercion, which are not specified in any contract. In this regard, the theory of efficient contracts 
is an unpromising direction for minimizing labor opportunism in Russia. 
In the economic literature, thanks to the work of researchers such as E.V. Popov (2004) and Oliver E. Williamson
(1993), an idea has been developed of the essential nature of opportunistic behavior. It relates to any violations of 
forms of obligations, for example when firms violate contracts during transactions.  
Labor opportunism is an intentional hidden infringement by the worker of assumed obligations stipulated by the 
labor contract.
The origin of opportunism is an asymmetry of information, which significantly complicates the problems of 
economic organization. Labor opportunism seldom appears in its explicit forms, such as absenteeism (unauthorized 
absence from the workplace). More often, opportunism manifests itself in more covert forms. In the economic 
literature there are descriptions of various forms of opportunistic behavior: adverse selection, «extortion», shirking, 
«moral risk», carelessness (including knowingly permitting negligence), their different types and combinations. 
However, most of these occur under conditions in which the collection of reliable information about the behavior of 
employees involves great expense or is even impossible, and «only a small part of what people actually do at work 
amenable to detailed control» (R.R. Nelson, 1981).
Opportunism is a source of «behavioral» uncertainty, causing a lot of problems in the form of explicit and hidden 
losses.  According to the estimates of E.V. Popov (2004), shirking leads to a decrease in performance of 34 % on 
average, while negligence leads to an average increase in expenses of 27.5 %. In addition, there are significant costs 
involved in protecting against opportunistic behavior. 
The opportunism of employees, however, is closely connected to the opportunism of their managers. This study
attempts to identify the nature of that relationship and provides evidence that the opportunism of lecturers at KFU is 
a defensive reaction to the opportunism of the authorities.
The objective of this study was toidentify the causes of labor opportunism staff organization and determine of 
recommendations to minimize it.
In line with the objectives of the study was identified the need to solve the following problems:
1 How to identify and quantify the level of labor opportunism of staff  
2 Is there a statistically significant relationship between opportunism of staff and their managers? 
3 Is there an opportunistic trap in the organization and how to assess the degree of her stability?
4 Based on analysis of closeness of the connectionbetween the factors of labor opportunism to develop measures 
and methods to minimize it.
2. Methods of research
2.1. Modelofthestudy
To investigate the level of opportunism in Kazan (Volga) Federal University (hereafter KFU) a survey method 
was used. To solve study’s problems, regression models were built on the basis of an analysis of data from a 
questionnaire completed by faculty members and heads of institutions and departments of the KFU, which enables 
us to identify the most significant factors leading to labor opportunism for faculty members and leaders separately. 
The study was performed using regression analysis techniques, these questionnaires were processed using the 
method of least squares regression analysis (OLS).
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Using the regression equations obtained, the level of opportunism amongst faculty members and managers was 
calculated, and the degree of stability of “opportunistic traps” in KFU was assessed.
2.2. Groupofthestudy
A scattered quota sample was used for the purposes of the research. 787 faculty members from across the 
institutes and faculties of KFU, aged between 22 and 65 years, took part in the survey, along with 
47 managers from different levels, giving a total of 834 persons. The general population as measured by the 
number of staff in KFU on 1 November 2013 was 2539 people (according to information provided 
by the Personnel Department).
2.3. Datacollectiontools
Two types of questionnaires were developed: the first a questionnaire for the assessment of the opportunism of 
employees; the second for managers of the University.
The questionnaires included 31 questions that investigate different factors in the emergence and manifestation of 
labor opportunism in the University. The factors were identified through interviewing faculty members from various 
institutions within KFU, and divided into 5 aggregate groups: organizational (transaction), communication, 
demotivating, tangible and intangible. The results of the questionnaires were processed using a least-squares 
regression analysis method (OLS).
To enable a quantitative analysis of the questionnaires, the Harrington verbal / numeric scale was applied; a 
method that is widely and effectively used in practice for solving various tasks with expert methods(Glotov, V., 
Pavelev, V. 1984).
2.4. The analysis of the data
The data obtained from 787 faculty members and 47 managers from different levels using data acquisition tools 
were transferred to the Gretl package software. In line with the objective of the study, required statistical calculations 
have been made using correlation, variance analysis, t-test and regression analysis methods.
3. Results 
The analysis of opportunism amongst faculty members in KFU was conducted on the basis of regression model 1, 
the results of which are presented in table 1:
Table 1. Model 1: Causes of staff’s opportunism
B Std. Error t p
X4 .064 .02 2 .76 .00
X9 - .073 .03 -2 .42 .01
X11_1 .049 .02 2 .74 .00
X11_2 .19 .04 4 .56 .00
X11_3 .11 .04 2 .62 .01
X12_1 .0813 .04 2 .31 .02
ɏ .08 .03 2 .47 .01
ɏB - .09 .03 -2 .66 .01
ɏB .12 .04 2 .87 .00
ɏB .43 .03 13 .86 .00
ɏ .14 .04 3 .88 .00
ɏ .23 .03 6 .29 .00
ɏ - .09 .04 -2 .36 .02
ɏ - .11 .03 -3 .04 .00
R = .89   R2 =.79  F = 194.5    p < .05
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To interpret the degree of impact of the revealed factors on the level of opportunism of faculty members, 





                                                                                (1)
Where bi is a regression coefficient, Ei is the average elasticity of X and X is the average coefficient of 
elasticity of factor Xi.
From the total of 31 factors the following were selected by a process of regression analysis of the most 
significant characteristics of the model (with minimum values of the errors on indicators P-value (F)) and the 
maximum value of the coefficients of elasticity, reflecting the degree of their influence on the level of labor 
RSSRUWXQLVPDPRQJVWDIIɏVHHWDEOH2). 
Table 2. Factors influencing the opportunism of faculty members
Variables Variable names Elasticity
ɏB Level of opportunism amongst management of the Faculty 0,61
ɏ Level of social support given by the management of KFU to the staff 0,47
X11_2 Level of trust offered by the staff to the management of the Faculty 0,29
ɏ The level of support offered by the leadership of the Faculty to employees for improvement of Department, Institute 
(faculty), or KFU activities. 
0,24
ɏ Level of positive changes in your faculty 0,20
ɏ Level of social justice in KFU 0,19
ɏB Efficiency and rationality of the actions of the management of KFU 0,15
X12_1 Level of trust offered by management to the  KFU staff 0,14
ɏB Efficiency and rationality of actions of the  management of the  Department 0,13
X11_3 Level of trust offered by faculty members to the management of Department 0,12
X11_1 Level of trust offered by faculty members to the management of KFU 0,09
ɏ Satisfaction with the relationship between employees and management 0,09
X9 The handing over the job of the Department or Faculty management to  their subordinates 0,081
The elasticity ratio indicator ɏ22_1 equals.61, which means that the level of opportunism of faculty 
members will be reduced by .61% if the level of Faculty management opportunism is reduced by 1%.
The second most important factor of teachers’ labor opportunism was the level of opportunism amongst faculty 
management. For the head, a situation involving «fuzzy» duties assigned to workers is very convenient, because in 
this situation they have an opportunity to abuse their power. A manager is able to dictate the type of work and level 
of workload of subordinates on his own. In this case, the head may wish to offload one-off fixed-term orders and 
jobs onto employees who are able to do them without complaint and with high quality. The staff who in one form or 
another demonstrate their discontent (sometimes in form of open aggression), or try to shift jobs to someone else, 
are, as a rule, avoided. A manager is not going to test the resistance of these subordinates every time, so he 
minimizes his own stress and offloads additional unpaid work onto employees, who are ready to do the extra work. 
In this way a situation appears in which workers are overworked, but not able to dedicate their full attention to the 
official duties for which they receive a salary. Employees are not paid more or motivated to do extra work, therefore 
they perceive it as an additional burden and execute it poorly. This contributes to a situation in KFU of independence 
of wages from the results of work effort - the third most important factor in the faculty members’ labor opportunism. 
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3.1. Faculty member’s opportunism as a defensive response 
Analysis of the causes of faculties management opportunism in institutions conducted according to a survey of 
faculty members showed that the main factor of faculty members opportunism is the indicator ɏ23, (see Model 6, 
table 3) with a regression coefficient of.45 and an elasticity coefficient of .33.
Table 3. Model 6: Causes of the faculty management’s opportunism
B Std. Error t p
X9 .18 .03 6 .00 .00
ɏB .20 .05 4 .25 .00
ɏ .28 .03 7 .93 .00
ɏ .13 .04 3 .64 .00
ɏ - .12 .04 -2 .88 .00
ɏ .45 .03 13 .86 .00
R = .93   R2 =.87  F = 379.34    p < .05
The results of the regression analysis were identified and ranked the factors affecting the opportunism of 
managers. Results of the analysis are given in the table 4.
Table 4. Factors of manager’s opportunism
Rank The name of index Flexibility
1 X24 The level of support offered by employees to the Faculties Management in improvement of KFU’s 
Department, Faculty, or University activities 
.34
2 X23 The level of opportunism of faculty members .33
3 X21_2 The efficiency and rationality of the Faculties managers in the eyes of subordinates .20
4 X25 The level of social support of employees of the KFUs management .19
5 X27 The level of social justice in KFU .16
6 X9 Managers of the  Institute (faculty) shifts their work on subordinates .14
Given that one of the relevant factors in the opportunism of faculty members is faculty management opportunism 
(see table 2), the finding identified in model 6 indicates the existence of closely interdependent links between faculty 
members opportunism and their managers. If we take into account the results of the analysis of the reasons for 
opportunism amongst the workers, it can be assumed that they were the consequence of a response to the 
opportunism of heads of structural subdivisions of KFU. 
To test this assumption, the closeness of ties between the opportunism of the faculty members and their managers 
was analyzed, which resulted in the identification of a significant relationship. 
For greater reliability the respective regression models were constructed according to a survey of both - faculty 
members and managers - heads of departments, deans of faculties. The following results are obtained. 
1. The opportunism of the faculty members is significantly influenced by the opportunism of Institute Directors 
(deans) (the regression coefficient is .53, elasticity - .75). The share of influence of opportunism amongst heads of 
departments proved insignificant (the regression coefficient is .00093), so heads of departments were excluded from 
further analysis. 
2. Using elasticity coefficients, the opportunistic reactions of faculty members and heads to the demonstration of 
opportunism by each of the parties were calculated. Workers in their assessments estimated a lower likely 
opportunistic response to the opportunism of the managers and also a lower estimate of the reaction of the authorities 
to their own opportunism. 
Managers in their assessments overestimated the opportunist reaction of their subordinates, and overstated their 
own. Thus, each of the parties unanimously overestimated management’s opportunistic response in relation to 
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subordinates. From the ratio of the excess data it can be estimated which party is more inclined to opportunistic 
behavior; the results of the calculations are given in table 5:
Table 5. Score of propensity to opportunism
Estimation Reaction
(the coefficients of elasticity)
The propensity to engage in opportunistic 
behavior
Faculty members Managers
Faculty members Managers (gr2-JUɝɪ (gr3-gr2):gr2
Faculty members .75 .84 -.11 -
Managers .81 .91 - .12
As can we see from the estimates given in the table 5, faculty members have a negative tendency towards 
opportunism. This means that they are not the initiators of opportunistic behavior; their role is passive, subservient. 
Heads of institutions (faculties) are more than 2.16 times more likely to behave opportunistically (even according 
to their own estimates) than their subordinates. This is a natural consequence of hierarchical power, which enables 
them to establish rules to their own advantage. For this reason, the opportunism of the heads is a heavy burden on 
faculty members. Faculty members in turn strengthen their forms of labor opportunism. The process may take the 
form of self-reinforcing tendencies resulting in an opportunistic trap. In both cases, opportunism occurs as a result of 
violation of the equilibrium of conformity in labor relations. In a formalized form the condition of stability of 
opportunistic equilibrium can be represented as the following dependence:
OpM 1 min
OpFM
 o                                                                                                                                              (2)
WhereOpM here is an opportunism level of the heads of institutions (faculties) OpFM is the opportunism level of 
faculty members. 
Minimization of the level of opportunism is in the interest of both parties, as both parties suffer from its presence, 
so this dependence is oriented to a minimum. However, the condition of equality in the level of opportunism can be 
under rather high values. To quantify the level of opportunism of KFUs faculty members can be obtained in the 
result of analysis in model 1 (table 1) coefficients of the regression, which are used by building a regression 
equation:
Y= .06X4+ .ɏ .ɏB .2X11_2+ .ɏB .ɏB .08ɏ- .09X21_1+ .ɏB .ɏB  
.14X24+ .23X25- .10X27- .11ɏ (3)
Substituting the average values of relevant variables into this equation, the average level of opportunism of KFUs 
faculty members was calculated as: Y = .581 This figure suggests that, ideally, the productivity of faculty members 
could be increased by 58.1 % if the influence of the identified factors of their opportunism could be neutralized.
According to the results of analysis of the regression coefficients (model 6 table 3)  a regression equation of 
leaders’ opportunism was constructed:
YM= .18X9+ .20X21_2 + .28X24 + .13X25- .12X27+ .ɏ
Substituting the average values of relevant variables into this equation, the average quantitative assessment of 
opportunism level of KFUs Faculties heads was calculated: 
YM= .18* .3 + .2* .39+ .28* .47 + .13* .57- .12* .53+ .45* .27 = .40
This means that, in the opinion of employees, 40% of the KFUs managers’ activity is opportunistic in nature, i.e. 
40% of managers labor activity is spent unproductively. In this assessment the manifestations of managers’ 
opportunism faced by their subordinates are taken into account.  
From the correlation of the parties’ opportunism levels by the formula (2) the stability of opportunistic 
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This means when the coefficient of opportunistic equilibrium goes to 1 and there is an identified increased 
tendency to opportunism of the heads of institutions (faculties) in the near future, we have to expect further 
strengthening of the level of opportunism of managers, so that the value of the fraction could be closer to 1. 
Based on this analysis, a reduction in opportunism amongst faculty members seems unlikely because in KFU an 
“opportunistic trap” has been established. Administrative measures taken without consideration of the teachers’ 
opinions, and often contrary to them, makes them all the more indignant, starting the “flywheel” of their 
opportunism. 
4. Discussion andconclusion
1. This analysis has allowed us to identify the current level of staff opportunism in KFU. The average 
opportunism is 58% of faculty members and 40% of the heads of faculties. 
2. Faculty members’ opportunism is a response to the opportunism of their heads, while at the same time the 
heads of divisions are more prone to engage in opportunistic behavior (even according to their own estimates) than 
their subordinates. 
3. Results of the cross-analysis of the reasons for labor opportunism testify to the homogeneity of the reasons of 
occurrence of opportunistic behavior of faculty members and their managers, evidenced by common factors found in 
the analysis of faculty members and faculty managers. 
Among the significant factors mentioned above which contribute to the current level of teacher’s opportunism, 
the determining factor is the management style, because all the following factors, in varying degrees, are derived 
from this. 
The management style must change, since the external and internal environment of KFU is continuously 
changing. Neglect of this inevitably leads to a conflict between KFU’s aims and methods of achieving them. It is 
difficult to demand creativity and scientific effectiveness from faculty members through manipulation.
A way out of the problem is the creation of the training system for the management; it is necessary to teach them 
modern personnel management techniques, based on mutual trust. At present the level of subordinates’ trust in the 
management of KFU faculties is about 59%, and trust in KFUs management is 48%, according to the survey of 
faculty members. The average level of the management’s trust in subordinates is lower than 52%. According to
Patrick Lencioni (2011), an effective team cannot be formed under conditions of low or average levels of trust. Trust 
cannot occur suddenly by order of management. The building of trust is an ongoing, systematic process in which 
managers require support.
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